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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine, after years of hard work, you decide to invest your money, only to be 
defrauded by your financial adviser.  This tragedy actually occurred when the Bayou 
Hedge Fund (“Bayou”) stole over $300,000,000 from thousands of investors.1  Some 
of the investors defrauded did not willingly choose to invest in Bayou.2  Among 
them were workers of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority who were 
indirectly exposed to the fund through their pension plan.3  In addition, others were 
defrauded because of their direct investment in Bayou or through their investment in 
a fund of a hedge fund (“fund of fund”).4 
Bayou was formed in 1996 and after a few months started losing money.5  Rather 
than report these losses, the two owners of the fund, Samuel Israel III and Daniel E. 
Marino, began a fraudulent scheme.6 Their actions resulted in innocent investors 
losing approximately $350,000,0007 and Marino threatening to commit suicide.8  To 
conceal this fraud, Israel and Marino issued false and misleading financial 
statements, account statements, and performance summary documents to both clients 
and potential investors.9  Bayou fabricated its supposedly independent audit10 reports 
                                                                
1Gretchen Morgenson, A Hedge Fund Falls Off the Face of the Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
28, 2005, at C1. 
2Brett Arends, T Pension $ Mired in Bayou Hedge Fund Scandal, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 
22, 2005, at 30. 
3Id. 
4Gretchen Morgenson, Connect the Dots. Find the Fees., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 3, at 
1 (“Because Bayou's minimum-investment requirement of $250,000 was smaller than that of 
most hedge funds, the firm unfortunately attracted a lot of individual investors.”).  Moreover, 
numerous investors were exposed to Bayou through their investments in funds of funds which 
have minimum investment requirements as low as $25,000.  Id.    
5See Complaint at 2, SEC v. Israel III, No. 05-8376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19406.pdf. 
6Gretchen Morgenson, What Really Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at 
C1.  The fraud perpetrated by Bayou started in 1996 and ended in 2005.  Id. 
7See Complaint, supra note 5, at 2. 
8Morgenson, supra note 6. 
9See id. 
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by creating a fictitious accounting firm known as Richmond-Fairfield Associates.11  
It executed its trades through Bayou Securities, a broker-dealer,12 owned by Israel.13  
While Bayou Securities earned large profits on trades, the Bayou Hedge Fund 
continued to suffer severe losses.14  Attempting to hide money from investors, Israel 
and Marino transferred approximately $100,000,000 to European bank accounts.15  
When the money was wired from Europe back to the United States it was seized by 
the Arizona Attorney General.16  Two months later, Israel and Marino sent a letter to 
Bayou’s investors stating that the fund would be liquidated and ninety percent of the 
clients’ money would be returned.17  However, redemption checks tendered to clients 
were returned for insufficient funds. 18  Therefore, it is likely that the only money 
available to investors out of the $450,000,000 invested in Bayou is the $100,000,000 
seized by the Arizona Attorney General.19 
Bayou is one of nearly eight thousand hedge funds.20  The term “hedge fund” has 
no uniformly accepted definition, but generally refers to a private investment vehicle 
that invests in numerous assets and employs many different investment strategies.21  
Hedge funds differ in three important ways from mutual funds, which are the typical 
                                                          
10JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
TERMS 41 (2003) (“[An] audit [is a] professional examination and verification of a company’s 
accounting documents and supporting data for the purpose of rendering an opinion as to their 
fairness, consistency, and conformity with GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES.”).  
11See Complaint, supra note 5, at 6. 
12DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 160.  A broker-dealer is an individual or firm 
acting as a principal in a securities transaction.  Principals trade for their own account and risk.  
Id.  When buying from a broker acting as a dealer, a customer receives securities from the 
firm’s inventory; and the confirmation must disclose this transaction.  Id.  Since most 
brokerage firms operate as brokers and principals the term broker-dealer is commonly used.  
Id.  
13See Complaint, supra note 5, at 5. 
14See id. at 8. 
15See id. at 9. 
16See Morgenson, supra note 6. 
17Id. 
18See id. 
19Id. 
20
 Amanda Cantrell, Take My Hedge Fund . . . Please:  Like a Worn Out Comedian Hedge 
Funds are Having a Tough, Sobering 2005 (Oct. 14, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/14/ 
technology/hedgefunds/index.htm.  Currently, commentators believe that the assets in hedge 
funds are over $1,000,000,000,000.  Id.  
21This definition is similar to the one given in almost every government report, 
practioner’s guide, and scholarly work reviewed by the author.  See, e.g., IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]; DOUGLAS 
L. HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2005); Willa 
E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000).  
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investment for an average investor.22  First, unlike mutual funds, most hedge funds 
charge a twenty percent profit participation fee.23  This means that the hedge fund 
manager keeps twenty percent of the profits.24  Second, while most mutual funds do 
not use leverage, which is the use of borrowed money to enhance returns, over 
seventy percent of hedge funds do use leverage.25  Third, unlike mutual funds, hedge 
funds are not diversified.26  Whereas most mutual funds diversify by investing in 
many different assets, hedge funds often have their money in only a few securities.27  
Because of hedge funds’ lack of diversification, use of leverage, and profit 
participation fees, they are inherently more risky than mutual funds.28     
Most hedge funds are limited to “qualified clients” and “qualified purchasers” to 
escape regulation under the federal securities laws.29  Generally, a “qualified 
purchaser” is a natural person who owns at least $5,000,000 in investments.30  By 
contrast, a “qualified client” is an investor having either a net worth of $1,500,000 or 
having $750,000 invested in the fund.31 
                                                                
22See INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005 1 
(2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_05_equity_owners.pdf.  Mutual funds are the 
most common investment of the average investor.  See id. at 4.  However, this trend may be 
changing because of alternative investments such as hedge funds.  See id.  
23Mitchell D. Eichen & John M. Longo, The Future of Hedge Funds: Five Emerging 
Trends, J. FIN. PLAN. BETWEEN ISSUES E-NEWSL., Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.fpanet.org/ 
journal/BetweenTheIssues/Contributions/121505.cfm.    
24Id. 
25Inv. Co. Inst., The Differences Between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds, 
http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs_hedge.html (last visited May 20, 2007). 
26Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control 36 (U. Pa. L. Sch. Scholarship at Penn Law, Working Paper No. 99, 2006), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=upenn/wps. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11. 
3015 U.S.C. § 80a-2a(51)(A)(i) (2000).  A “qualified purchaser” is not the same as a 
“qualified client.”  Additionally, it is more financially difficult to be a “qualified purchaser” 
than to be a “qualified client.”  See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11.  According to the 
Commission: 
 Section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act generally defines “qualified 
purchaser” to be: (1) any natural person who owns not less than $5 million in 
investments; (2) any family-owned company (as described in that section) that owns 
not less than $5 million in investments; (3) any other trust the trustee and settlor(s) of 
which are qualified purchasers that was not formed for the specific purpose of 
acquiring the securities of the Section 3(c)(7) fund; and (4) any person acting for its 
own account or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, that owns and invests on a 
discretionary basis not less than $25 million in investments.  
STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 12. 
 
31Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,076 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss2/6
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Funds of funds have different investment requirements than hedge funds.32  
Funds of funds are entities that invest in two or more traditional hedge funds.33  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) only imposes an 
investment minimum on funds of funds of $25,000.34  In addition, funds of funds 
have much less restrictive investment requirements than traditional hedge funds 
because investors only have to meet the “accredited investor” standard.35  An 
“accredited investor”36 is an investor having an individual income of $200,000 or 
                                                          
 A “qualified client” under rule 205-3 is: (i) A natural person who or a company that 
immediately after entering into the contract has at least $ 750,000 under the 
management of the investment adviser; (ii) A natural person who or a company that 
the investment adviser entering into the contract (and any person acting on his behalf) 
reasonably believes, immediately prior to entering into the contract, either: (A) Has a 
net worth (together, in the case of a natural person, with assets held jointly with a 
spouse) of more than $ 1,500,000 at the time the contract is entered into; or (B) Is a 
qualified purchaser as defined in section 2(a)(51)(A) of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 [15 U.S.C. § 80a-2] at the time the contract is entered into; or (iii) A natural 
person who immediately prior to entering into the contract is: (A) An executive 
officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person serving in a similar capacity, of the 
investment adviser; or (B) An employee of the investment adviser (other than an 
employee performing solely clerical, secretarial or administrative functions with 
regard to the investment adviser) who, in connection with his or her regular functions 
or duties, participates in the investment activities of such investment adviser, provided 
that such employee has been performing such functions and duties for or on behalf of 
the investment adviser, or substantially similar functions or duties for or on behalf of 
another company for at least 12 months.  
Id. 
32Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Funds of Hedge Funds: Higher Costs and Risks for Higher 
Potential Returns (Aug. 23, 2002), http://www.nasd.com/InvestorInformation/InvestorAlerts/ 
index.htm (follow “Funds of Hedge Funds - Higher Costs and Risks for Higher Potential 
Returns” hyperlink). 
33JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, HEDGE FUNDS OF FUNDS INVESTING: AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE 3 
(2004).   
34Elizabeth LeBras, SEC Should Rethink Funds-of-Hedge Funds Sales Restrictions, Says 
Eisenberg, COMPLIANCE REP., Nov. 14, 2005, at 1. 
35See id. 
36See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 15.   
 The term “accredited investors” is defined to include:  
Individuals who have a net worth, or joint worth with their spouse, above $1,000,000, 
or have income above $200,000 in the last two years (or joint income with their spouse 
above $300,000) and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in 
the year of investment; or are directors, officers or general partners of the hedge fund 
or its general partner; and  
 Certain institutional investors, including: banks; savings and loan associations; 
registered brokers, dealers and investment companies; licensed small business 
investment companies; corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies and 
business trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets; and many, if not most, employee 
benefit plans and trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets. 
Id. (discussing Rule 501 under the Securities Act).  See 15 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(6) (2007).  
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
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joint income of $300,000, or having individual or joint net worth of $1,000,000.37  
Because of the low investment minimum and the less restrictive standards, funds of 
funds are readily available to average investors.38 
Although participation in hedge funds and funds of funds was once limited to 
wealthy investors, average investors have increasing exposure to these entities.39  An 
increasing number of average investors can meet the requirement of being an 
“accredited investor” and thus can invest in funds of funds.40  Many individuals can 
meet the net worth requirement of over $1,000,000 because of the rise in home 
values over the past twenty years.41  In addition, 2,400,000 taxpayers who had an 
adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more meet the annual income requirement.42 
Increased instances of fraud like the kind perpetrated by Bayou is the one of three 
reasons why this industry needs more regulation.43 Secondly, because hedge funds 
engage in high risk investments and charge excessive management fees, hedge funds 
and funds of funds are unsuitable for the average investor.44  Finally, more regulation 
is needed because of the overall risk that hedge funds’ use of leverage poses to the 
financial markets.45   
To detect and deter fraud, the SEC should require all hedge funds to register with 
the Commission, use a risk-based approach rather than a cyclical approach to 
auditing funds, and impose guidelines to determine which funds to audit.  To prevent 
                                                                
37Id. 
38See Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, supra note 32.    
39GEORGE P. VAN, HEDGE FUND DEMAND AND CAPACITY 2005-2015, at 10 (2005), 
available at http://www.blumontcapital.com/downloads/articles/082605_HedgeFund 
CommentaryFromVAN.pdf.  
40Curtis Zimmermann, Glauber Eyes Minimum Income Rule for Hedge Fund Sales, 
COMPLIANCE REP., Nov. 28, 2005, at 1.  Robert Glauber, the president of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is advocating that funds of funds adopt minimum 
investment requirements.  Id.   
41Id. 
42Brian Balkovic, High-Income Tax Returns for 2002, SOI BULL., Spring 2005, at 6, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02hiinco.pdf (last visited May 20, 2007).  “[F]or 
2002, there were 2,414,128 individual income tax returns reporting AGI of $200,000 or more, 
and 2,464,515 returns with expanded income of $200,000 or more. These returns represented 
1.856 percent and 1.895 percent, respectively, of all returns for 2002.”  Id. at 6. 
43Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,066 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).  
44David F. Swensen, Op-Ed., Invest at Your Own Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21.  
David Swensen is Yale’s chief investment officer and manages more than $14,000,000,000 in 
endowment assets.  Id.  The Yale endowment has outperformed all other endowments over the 
past decade posting annual returns of 16%.  Id.   
45See Nicholas Chany et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds (MIT Sloan School of Mgmt., 
Working Paper No. 4535-05, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr  
act_id=671443. 
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average investors from investing in hedge funds, the SEC should require that 
investors in funds of funds meet the definition of a “qualified client” and ought to 
raise the minimum investment requirement for funds of funds and traditional hedge 
funds to $250,000.  To decrease the probability of financial market collapse, the SEC 
should limit hedge funds’ ability to use leverage by employing the same restrictions 
imposed on mutual funds.    
Part II of this Note describes the history and development of hedge funds.  Part 
III illustrates the current problems facing the hedge fund industry.  Part IV discusses 
hedge fund regulation prior to the Amended Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  Part 
V analyzes the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act.  Part VI discusses 
problems with the Amended Advisers Act.  Part VII proposes solutions for more 
effective regulation of hedge funds.  Part VIII summarizes the Note and advocates 
for the proposed solutions.  Part IX briefly discusses the case Goldstein v. SEC 
which struck down the Amended Advisers Act.   
II.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HEDGE FUNDS 
In 1949, Alfred Winslow Jones established the first hedge fund.46  The fund took 
large investment positions in stocks, betting that the stocks would increase in value.47  
The fund also used leverage to enhance returns.48  It hedged,49 or limited its risk, by 
investing a smaller amount of the fund’s money in investments that would increase 
in value if the stocks decreased in value.50  Therefore, if the stock prices did go 
down, the fund would make a little money on the smaller investments and thus limit 
the losses sustained from the larger investments.51 Jones structured the fund as a 
limited partnership and used an incentive fee whereby he kept twenty percent of the 
profits.52   
Most hedge funds today are set up similar to Jones’ fund in that they charge a 
profit participation fee of twenty percent and are structured as limited partnerships.53  
The limited partnership structure is used so that the profits of the fund are only taxed 
at the individual investor level.54  The fund has several limited partner investors, and 
one general partner who is the hedge fund adviser.55 The hedge fund adviser is 
                                                                
46HedgeCo.net, The Origin of Hedge Funds, http://www.hedgeco.net/hedge-fund-
information.htm (last visited May 20, 2007). 
47Id. 
48Id. 
49DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 304 (“Hedging [is a] strategy used to offset 
investment risk.  A perfect hedge is one eliminating the possibility of future gain or loss.”).   
50HedgeCo.net, supra note 46.   
51Id. 
52Id. 
53Gibson, supra note 21, at 684.   
54Id. at 683-84.  Some hedge funds are structured as limited liability companies which also 
allow for pass-through tax treatment.  DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.      
55See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 10.   
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usually one or two individuals who structure themselves as a limited liability 
company or a closely held corporation.56     
The hedge fund trading strategy is different from the mutual fund strategy.  There 
are two main differences in the strategies employed by mutual funds and hedge 
funds.57  First, mutual funds are generally buy-and-hold investors in that they buy 
securities and keep them for a long duration.58  This passive trading strategy is very 
different from the active trading strategy employed by hedge funds.59  Hedge funds 
change investments frequently to generate returns from fluctuations in market 
prices.60  Because certain movements in asset prices are temporary, hedge funds as 
active traders hope to make money and unwind their positions in a short period of 
time.61  The second major difference in strategy is mutual funds’ and hedge funds’ 
level of diversification.62  Because mutual funds are diversified,63 if the market 
moves against their investment positions in a few securities, they will not suffer 
severe losses.  By contrast, a hedge fund used to exploit a particular trend in the 
market may have a lot of money invested in only a few securities.64  This lack of 
diversification makes hedge funds inherently more risky than mutual funds because, 
if the market moves against the position of the hedge fund, then the fund will suffer 
substantial losses.   
Jones’ success as a hedge fund adviser did not go unnoticed.  In 1966, it was 
reported that his hedge fund substantially outperformed the top mutual funds.65  As a 
result of Jones’s success, between 1966 and 1968, many new hedge funds were 
launched.66  Like Jones’ fund, these funds used leverage to increase returns.67  
However, unlike Jones, many of these managers did not hedge their risk in an effort 
                                                                
56Hedge Fund World.com, Forming a Hedge Fund, http://www.hedgefundworld.com/ 
forming_a_hedge_fund.htm (last visited May 20, 2007). 
57See Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 53. 
58See Steven Lumpkin & Hans J. Blommestein, Hedge Funds, Highly Leveraged 
Investment Strategies and Financial Markets, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, June 1999, at 27, 30, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/63/1923224.pdf. 
59Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 53. 
60Lumpkin & Blommestein, supra note 58, at 32. 
61Kahan & Rock, supra note 26. 
62Inv. Co. Inst, supra note 25, at 36. 
63Id. 
64Id. 
65William Fung & David Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 309, 310 
(1999). 
66Id. 
67Id. at 311. 
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to limit loss.68  Because these managers did not hedge risk, in the 1970’s when the 
financial markets took a downturn, these hedge funds suffered severe losses.69     
Hedge funds faded back into obscurity until 1986, when an article reported that a 
hedge fund had compounded annual returns of forty-three percent during its first six 
years of existence.70  This performance increased investors’ interest in hedge funds.71  
As a result, in the 1990’s, the number of hedge funds increased dramatically.72  This 
growth in the quantity of hedge funds73 was accompanied by an increase in the 
number of investment strategies employed by the funds.74  In 1998, the growth of 
these funds culminated with the collapse of a large hedge fund named Long-Term 
Capital Management.75   
This collapse did not deter investors from investing in hedge funds.  From 1999 
to 2004 the amount invested in hedge funds doubled and is now more than 
$1,000,000,000.76  Assets in hedge fund are growing faster than mutual fund assets 
and already equal one-fifth of the assets of mutual funds.77  Furthermore, over the 
past five years, the number of hedge funds has doubled, and they now number over 
8,000.78 
While hedge funds have experienced rapid growth, funds of funds have increased 
at an even greater pace.79  From 1990 to 2002, the annual growth rate for the assets 
invested in funds of funds was forty-eight percent compared to a growth rate of 
twenty-six percent for the industry as a whole.80  While hedge funds are a relatively 
                                                                
68Dave Inglis, A Brief History of Hedge Funds, http://www.hughestrustco.com/articles/a_ 
%20brief_history_of_hedge_funds.html (last visited May 20, 2007). 
69Id.  
70See Fung & Hsieh, supra note 65.  This article was published in Institutional Investor 
and reported the returns of Julian Robertson’s Tiger Fund.  Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
73See id. 
74See Gibson, supra note 21, at 685-86 (“Some hedge funds engage in conservative trading 
strategies, while other funds are more aggressive. . . .  Trading strategy categories for hedge 
funds include: relative value hedge funds, event driven hedge funds, equity hedge funds, 
global asset allocator hedge funds, short selling hedge funds, sectoral hedge funds, and 
market-neutral hedge funds.”).   
75See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND 
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT viii (1999), available at 
http://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING 
GROUP]. 
76See Cantrell, supra note 20. 
77See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). 
78Amy Borrus, A Guide to the Hedge-Fund Maze, BUS. WK., Oct. 19, 2005, at 55.  
79See NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 8.   
80Id.   
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new investment vehicle, funds of funds are even newer in that less than ten percent 
of those that existed in 2002 were in existence in 1990, and more than seventy-five 
percent of the funds in existence in 2002 were started after 1996.81  The assets 
invested in funds of funds represent over one-third of the total amount invested in 
hedge funds.82 
III. PROBLEMS IN THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
Because of the growth of traditional hedge funds and funds of funds, three 
problems are now highly visible.  One problem is the SEC’s inability to detect or 
deter the increased instances of hedge fund fraud.  Most of the fraud occurs before 
the Commission is able to detect the problem, and therefore, investors are unable to 
get their money back.  Moreover, perpetrators of fraud are not deterred from 
committing this act because of the Commission’s lack of resources to detect the 
fraud.  Another problem is the unsuitability of traditional hedge funds and funds of 
funds to average investors. These funds’ lack of diversification, high management 
fees, and use of leverage make them too risky for the average investor.  The third 
problem is the potential risk hedge funds’ use of leverage poses to the financial 
markets.  If the market moves against the position of one large hedge fund or several 
small funds with similar investment positions, it could cause a collapse of the 
financial markets. 
A.  Inability to Detect and Deter Fraud 
The SEC has brought over sixty cases of fraud against hedge fund advisers who 
have defrauded investors out of billions of dollars.83  Specifically, in 2005 the 
Commission brought cases against three prominent hedge funds.84  Though the SEC 
has filed these cases,85 these suits were not brought until after the fraud occurred, 
with the result being that many investors will never get their money back.     
The Commission’s inability to detect fraud before it occurs and to deter fraud 
from occurring is most likely due to the nature in which such fraud is 
accomplished.86  Most hedge fund advisers who commit fraud do so by falsifying the 
fund’s track record to make their investments appear profitable,87 luring investors to 
invest in the fund, and keeping the money in the fund while continuing to charge 
profit participation and management fees.  For example, in the alleged fraud 
                                                                
81Id. 
82
 Paul Oranika, Hedge Funds to Woo New Investors Through Performance Reporting, 
(Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.hedgeco.net/news/08/2005/hedge-funds-woo-new-investors-
performance-reporting.html. 
83See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). 
84Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Accuses a Jersey Hedge Fund., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at 
C4.  These funds are the Bayou Group, the KL Group, and Wood River LLC.  Id.   
85Id. 
86See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054. 
87See Morgenson, supra note 6. 
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perpetrated by Wood River LLC (“Wood River”), marketing materials claimed 
twenty-five percent returns in the first eight months of 2005. 88  However, Wood 
River’s largest asset, its stake in Endwave Corporation, had actually declined 
seventy-six percent in the final three months of this reporting period.89  As with most 
fraud cases, by the time investors tried to get their money back, the firm stopped 
answering its phone, locked its doors, and the hedge fund adviser vanished.90  
Unfortunately, investors may never recoup the $250,000,000 invested in the fund.91 
Similarly, investors will probably not get back over $300,000,000 invested in 
Bayou.92  In addition to having false financial statements and continuing to charge 
fees, Bayou and Wood River have two other important common characteristics.93  
The two funds are similar in that they both had problems associated with their 
auditors and broker-dealers.94  Bayou’s auditor was a fake accounting firm created to 
produce false audits of Bayou.95  The broker-dealer was Bayou Securities, a dealer 
affiliated with the fund through which trades were made to create fraudulent 
commissions.96  With respect to Wood River, their marketing literature listed a 
former American Express unit as their outside auditor, but that company did not 
audit the fund.97  Furthermore, Wood River claimed that Morgan Stanley was one of 
its two prime brokers, but this firm never executed its trades.98 
B. Unsuitable for Average Investors 
While hedge fund fraud affects all investors, hedge funds pose problems that are 
unique to average investors. These three problems are hedge funds’ lack of 
diversification, use of leverage, and high management fees.  First, hedge funds are 
often not diversified99 and thus a move in the market against funds’ investments can 
result in negative returns occurring very quickly and in substantial quantities. 
Second, because many of these losses are incurred while employing leverage, 100 a 
large movement against the investment position can result in much greater losses 
                                                                
88Justin Hibbard & Adrienne Carter, Another Fishy Hedge Fund: A Mysterious Money 
Manager, Nonstop Hype, Plunging Returns, Empty Offices, and Now an SEC Probe—the 
Intrigue at Wood River Deepens, BUS. WK., Oct. 24, 2005, at 36-40. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Id.  
92See Morgenson, supra note 6. 
93Hibbard & Carter, supra note 88, at 36. 
94Morgenson, supra note 6. 
95Id. 
96Id. 
97Hibbard & Carter, supra note 88, at 38. 
98Id. 
99See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 36. 
100See generally Inv. Co. Inst, supra note 25. 
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than in mutual funds. Third, hedge funds’ twenty percent profit participation fee101 
means that they must generate a return that is twenty percent greater than the return 
generated by a mutual fund to make the same profit for an investor.  While wealthy 
investors may be able to absorb losses in a hedge fund because they have a well 
diversified portfolio,102 average investors could lose their entire life savings if they 
invest solely in a hedge fund. Furthermore, unlike wealthy investors, average 
investors typically have investments in a few assets103 and the potential large losses 
of hedge funds could thus seriously impact their financial status.   
In addition, the fees to invest in funds of funds are even higher than the fees 
associated with hedge funds.104  This is because funds of funds charge two layers of 
fees.105  The fees include the fees charged by the fund of fund and those charged by 
the underlying hedge funds.106  For example, the fees charged by a fund of fund 
usually include a management fee of one and a half percent, which is paid directly to 
the manager of the fund.107 The charges also indirectly include the profit participation 
fees and the management fees charged by underlying hedge funds because the fund 
of fund has to pay these fees to invest in hedge funds.108  Additionally, funds of funds 
are as risky as hedge funds because they invest solely in hedge funds.109  Because 
funds of funds have large fees and are high risk investments, they are unsuitable for 
average investors.110    
Finally, there has been an increase in the number of investors eligible to invest in 
funds of funds.  An investor must be an accredited investor to invest in funds of 
funds.  An “accredited investor” is an investor having an individual income of 
$200,000 or joint income of $300,000, or having individual or joint net worth of 
$1,000,000.111  The number of investors who meet the “accredited investor112” 
standard has significantly increased since the definition was drafted in 1982.113  The 
                                                                
101Eichen & Longo, supra note 23.   
102Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Funds for the Rest of Us: There’s a Slew of Mutual Funds 
Aiming to Bring Hedging Tactics to Average Investors (July 3, 2006), 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/30/markets/hedge_mutual/index.htm. 
103William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Diversification Decisions of Individual 
Investors and Asset Prices 3 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-31, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=469441. 
104See NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 55.   
105Id. 
106See id. 
107See id. 
108See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). 
109Id. 
110Id. 
11117 C.F.R. § 230.215(e)-(f) (2003). 
112Id.   
113See Zimmermann, supra note 40, at 1. 
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problem with using the current standard of “accredited investor” is that it has not 
been amended since it was adopted.114  Consequently, millions of investors now meet 
the $1,000,000 net worth requirement necessary to invest in funds of funds.115  One 
reason that investors who did not meet the definition of an “accredited investor” 
when it was drafted but who now do enjoy this status is the increase in home values 
over the last twenty years, which has caused an increase in these investors’ net 
worth.116  In addition, 2,400,000 taxpayers had an adjusted gross income of $200,000 
or more in 2002 and thus were eligible to invest in funds of funds.117 
C.  Hedge Funds Use of Leverage and Risk to Financial Markets 
Hedge funds’ problematic use of leverage is exemplified by the near collapse of 
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.  In addition, hedge funds cause a 
serious risk to financial markets through systemic risk. 
First, the possibility that hedge funds could cause a financial crisis affects both 
investors and non-investors.  In 1998, the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term 
Capital Management proved that the potential for such a crisis is not mere theory.118  
Long-Term Capital Management started in 1994 and by 1997 the amount invested in 
the fund increased substantially.119  At the end of 1997, even after returning over 
$2,500,000,000 to investors, there was still nearly $5,000,000,000 in the fund.120  
Despite reducing the amount of money invested in the fund, Long-Term Capital 
Management did not reduce its investment positions and continued to use leverage to 
maintain its current investment levels.121   
With respect to leverage, in August of 1998, the fund had $125,000,000,000 of 
investments financed with less than $5,000,000,000 of actual money.122  This means 
                                                                
114Id.  The SEC, when given the opportunity to address the definition of an “accredited 
investor” declined to change the requirements.  See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 5. 
115See Zimmermann, supra note 40, at 1. 
116Id. 
117See supra text accompanying note 42. 
118See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at A-2.  The SEC staff, in 
summarizing the information contained in this report, concluded that: 
 The report examined hedge funds in general as well as LTCM, analyzed the public 
policy issues presented to the markets by leverage, risk and bankruptcy, and 
recommended a number of measures designed to constrain excessive leverage in the 
financial system.   
      The report focused on the risk management and transparency issues raised by 
LTCM as well as “highly leveraged institutions” in general. It also focused on the 
exposure of banks and others to the counterparty risks of highly leveraged entities such 
as hedge funds. 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, app. A, at 3. 
 
119See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at 11.  
120Id.  
121Id. 
122Id. at 12. 
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the fund had a leverage ratio,123 which is the amount of debt compared to the amount 
of assets, of more than twenty-five to one.124  The fund’s leverage made it vulnerable 
to market conditions which are highly unpredictable and always changing.125  In 
August of 1998, following Russia’s devaluation126 of its currency, the ruble, Long-
Term Capital Management’s assets went from slightly over $4,000,000,000 to less 
than $2,000,000,000 bringing its losses for the year to over fifty percent.127   
To stave off the potential impact of the collapse to other financial institutions, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York persuaded fourteen commercial lenders to inject 
over $3,500,000,000 into the fund.128  This capital infusion prevented a potential 
collapse of the fund, a collapse which would have negatively impacted the world 
financial markets.129  Had Long-Term Capital Management not been able to meet its 
debts, the financial institutions who originally loaned money to the fund may not 
have been able to meet the debts they owed to other creditors.130  If this occurred, a 
domino effect would have resulted whereby financial institutions defaulted on their 
loans.131  Such defaults could cause chaos to the financial system.132 
Second, hedge funds’ use of leverage contributes to systemic risk.  Systemic risk 
is commonly used to describe the possibility of a series of defaults on loans by 
financial institutions in a short period of time caused by a single major event.133  It 
occurs when one participant in a financial market who is unable to pay its debt 
causes others who need to pay their debt to be unable to meet their obligations when 
due.134  Because the financial markets are interdependent, a sudden default by one 
large borrower or several small borrowers because of one major event can cause the 
financial markets to collapse.135  
                                                                
123DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 378-79.  The leverage ratio is often referred to 
as the debt-to-equity ratio because it reflects the amount of debt compared to the amount of 
shareholder’s equity on a financial balance sheet.  Id.  A firm with $3,000,000 in investments 
and $1,000,000 in debt would have a leverage or debt-to-equity ratio of thirty-three percent.          
124See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at B-13. 
125Id. 
126DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 175 (“Devaluation [is the] lowering of the 
value of a country’s currency relative to gold and/or the currencies of other nations.  
Devaluation can also result from a rise in value of other currencies relative to the currency of a 
particular country.”). 
127See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at 13.  
128Id. at 13-14. 
129Id. 
130Id. 
131Id.   
132Id. 
133Chan, supra note 45, at 1. 
134Id. 
135Id. 
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In September of 2005, the same fourteen commercial lenders who had visited the 
Federal Reserve during the Long-term Capital Management crisis returned to discuss 
hedge fund practices.136  The Federal Reserve’s invitation was issued in response to 
several reports by regulators, academics, and market participants expressing 
concerns about the increase of systemic risk caused by the investment positions of 
hedge funds. 137 Because the market events that cause systemic risk are highly 
unpredictable, the most effective way to prevent them from occurring is limiting 
large institutions’ use of leverage.138 
IV. REGULATION PRIOR TO THE AMENDED INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT 
Historically, hedge funds went largely unregulated because they qualified for a 
variety of exceptions which exempted them from regulation under the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.139  Even after adoption of the Amended 
Investment Advisers Act, hedge funds may still be subject to these regulations.140 
A.  Securities Act of 1933 
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 mandates that issuers of securities register 
with the Commission and comply with the various provisions of the Act.141  
Therefore, hedge funds that issue securities must register with the SEC unless they 
qualify for an exemption.142  One such exemption is section 4(2) of the Act, which 
exempts from registration issuers of securities that do not make a public offering.143  
Hedge funds take advantage of this requirement by only offering investment in their 
funds to private investors.144 These private investors include both “institutional 
investors,”145 which are organizations that invest in large volumes of securities, and 
                                                                
136Tim Reason, Who's Holding the Bag? Everyone Knows Banks are Shedding More Risk 
These Days  So Where Does it Go?, CFO MAG., Oct. 27, 2005, at 40.   
137See Chan, supra note 45, at 1. 
138Id. 
139See Gibson, supra note 21, at 688. 
140Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).  
141See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 13. 
142Id. at 13. 
14315 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).  The provisions of section 5 do not apply to transactions by 
an issuer not involving any public offering.  Id. 
144See Gibson, supra note 21, at 689.   
145DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 335-36.   
 [An] institutional investor [is an] organization that trades large volumes of securities.  
Some examples are mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, labor 
union funds, corporate profit-sharing plans, and college endowment funds.  Typically, 
upwards of 70% of the daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange is on behalf of 
institutional investors. 
Id. 
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individual investors with high net worth.146  Hedge funds can also claim the section 
4(2) exemption by meeting the requirements of Rule 506 of Regulation D, which 
governs private offerings.147 While Rule 506 is not the exclusive means for 
establishing the exemption, the rule is often described as a “safe harbor” provision 
because satisfaction of the provision establishes entitlement to the exemption.148 
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Hedge funds can be subject to regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 in two ways.149  First, this Act requires that broker-dealers register with the 
Commission, and such registration mandates that they comply with its 
requirements.150  Hedge funds typically do not meet the definition of a broker-dealer 
but are instead classified as traders and are thus exempted under this portion of the 
Act.151 The second part of the Act requires traders holding certain securities positions 
to register with the Commission.152  Section 12g and Rule 12g-1 require that a trader 
of securities with 500 investors and assets in excess of $10,000,000 register with the 
Commission.153  Hedge funds exempt themselves from this requirement by limiting 
their funds to 499 investors.154 
C. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires investment companies, 
companies that invest the pooled funds of small investors, to register with the SEC 
and comply with the provisions of the Act. 155  Nearly all hedge funds come within 
the definition of an investment company.156  However, hedge funds escape 
                                                                
146See Gibson, supra note 21, at 689.   
147See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 14. 
148See Gibson, supra note 21, at 689.    
149Id. at 691. 
150Id. at 691-92.       
151See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 18 (“The Commission historically has 
distinguished ‘dealers’ from ‘traders.’  A trader is a person that buys and sells securities, either 
individually or in a trustee capacity, but not as part of a regular business.  Entities that buy and 
sell securities for investment generally are considered traders, but not dealers.”).  
152See Joseph Hellrung, Note & Comment, Hedge Fund Regulation: Investors are 
Knocking at the Door, but can the SEC Clean House Before Everyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 317, 325 (2005).  
153See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 18. 
154See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 325.  
155See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 351 (“[An] investment company [is a] firm 
that, for a management fee, invests the pooled funds of small investors in securities 
appropriate for its stated investment objectives.  It offers participants more diversification, 
liquidity, and professional management service than would normally be available to them as 
individuals.”).    
      
156STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11 n.32. 
 Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines an investment company as 
an issuer which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage 
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registering by relying on one of two exclusions from the definition of an investment 
company.157           
The first exclusion is under section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act, 
which exempts from the definition of an investment company any issuer of securities 
with not more than 100 investors and which does not make a public offering.158  A 
limited partnership or corporation that invests in a hedge fund is treated as one 
investor for the purposes of the 100 investor limitation.159  Hedge funds take 
advantage of this exemption by limiting their funds to less than 100 private 
investors.160 
The second exclusion is under section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, 
which exempts from registration investment companies whose investments are 
owned only by “qualified purchasers” and which do not make or propose to make a 
public offering.161  Generally, a “qualified purchaser” is a natural person who owns at 
least $5,000,000 in investments.162  While this exemption is not limited to a certain 
number of investors, a fund using this exclusion typically limits the number of 
investors to less than 500 to escape regulation under the Securities Act of 1934.163 
D.  The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires an investment adviser with more 
than fifteen clients and over $30,000,000 in assets to register with the Commission 
and comply with its regulations.164  Nearly all hedge fund advisers meet the 
definition of an investment adviser.165  They satisfy the requirements because they 
                                                          
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities. Section 
3(a)(1)(C) of that Act defines an investment company as an issuer that is engaged or 
proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or 
trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a 
value exceeding 40 percent of the value of its total assets (exclusive of government 
securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.  Many hedge funds meet both of 
these definitions. 
Id.  
157See Gibson, supra note 21, at 694.   
15815 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000). 
159See Gibson, supra note 21, at 698.   
160Id.    
161Id. at 695. 
162See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11. 
163See Gibson, supra note 21, at 696.    
164See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 326.  
Advisors with less than twenty five million in assets are not permitted to register with 
the SEC.  Advisors with between twenty five and thirty million dollars under 
management are advised, but not required, to register with the SEC.  Advisors with at 
least thirty million of assets under management are required to register with the SEC.”  
 Id. at 345 n.94 (citations omitted). 
165See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 20.     
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counsel clients regarding investment opportunities.166  However, most hedge fund 
advisers escape regulation because they qualify for an exemption under section 
203(b) of this Act.167  This exemption is often referred to as the “private adviser 
exemption” because it exempts from registration investment advisers who have had 
less than fifteen clients during the preceding twelve months, who do not hold 
themselves out to the public as an investment adviser, and who are not advisers to a 
registered investment company.168   
Prior to the amendment of the Investment Advisers Act, section 203(b) allowed 
advisers to count each “legal organization”169 as a single client.170  This meant that a 
hedge fund structured as a limited partnership, with numerous limited partner 
investors and one general partner, was treated as a single client for purposes of the 
Act.171  Therefore, a hedge fund adviser could manage up to fourteen hedge funds 
and, by using this type of organizational structure, escape regulation.172  So long as 
the adviser managed less than fifteen funds, did not make a public offering of these 
funds, and such funds were not registered investment companies, the hedge fund 
adviser did not have to register with the Commission.173 
In sum, hedge funds have organized themselves to be exempt from registering 
and complying with federal securities laws.  Those funds that do not qualify for 
exemptions are subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.  The Amended Investment Advisers Act requires more hedge 
funds to register with the Commission and comply with its requirements. 
V.  THE AMENDMENTS TO THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT 
In December of 2004, the SEC amended the Investment Advisers Act, closing the 
203(b) exemption in an attempt to require hedge fund advisers to register with the 
Commission.174  The Act also sets forth requirements that hedge funds must meet to 
charge profit participation fees.175  Additionally, it mandates that funds of funds 
                                                                
166Recent Development in Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. 
& Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) (prepared statement of William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, U.S. SEC), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:92703.pdf (“Managers of hedge funds 
meet the definition of ‘investment adviser’ under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
because they are in the business of providing investment advice about securities to others.”).  
167See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 20.   
16815 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). 
169See Gibson, supra note 21, at 698.   
170Id.    
171Id.  
172Id.  
173Id. 
174Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).  
175Id. at 72,071. 
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register with the Commission.176  Finally, registration under the Act subjects hedge 
funds and funds of funds to various compliance requirements.177 
A.  Hedge Funds Must Register with the Commission 
The Amended Advisers Act requires that all “private funds” register with the 
Commission.178  In section 203(b)(3)-1, the SEC defines a “private fund” to reflect 
three common characteristics of hedge funds.179  A private fund is a firm that would 
be an investment company under section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 but for the exception provided from that definition by either section 3(c)(1) or 
section 3(c)(7) of the Act;180 that permits its owners to redeem any portion of their 
ownership interests within two years of the purchase of such interests;181 and whose 
interests are or have been offered based on the investment advisory skills, ability, or 
expertise of the investment adviser.182        
Provided that a hedge fund meets the requirements of a “private fund,” section 
203(b)(3)-2 requires advisers of “private funds” to count each client for purposes of 
determining the availability of the 203(b) “private adviser exemption.”183  If the 
hedge fund adviser advises more than fourteen clients, the adviser must register with 
the Commission.184  However, an adviser may no longer count each legal 
organization as a single client.185  The Act redefines the term client to include the 
shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries of a “private fund.”186  
Thus, advisers to private funds have to “look through” each fund under management 
                                                                
176Id. at 72,076. 
177Id. at 72,071. 
178Id. at 72,069. 
179Id. at 72,073 (“We proposed to define a ‘private fund’ by reference to three 
characteristics shared by virtually all hedge funds, and that differentiate hedge funds from 
other pooled investment vehicles such as private equity funds or venture capital funds.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
180Id. 
      
181Id. at 72,074. 
 Hedge funds typically offer their investors liquidity access following an initial “lock-
up” period, which is typically for less than two years. Thus, this provision will 
include most hedge fund advisers, but will exclude advisers that manage only private 
equity funds, venture capital funds, and similar funds that require investors to make 
long-term commitments of capital. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
182Id. at 72,068.  Other securities laws, such as rule 205-3(b) also require that investors 
meet the “qualified investor” criteria if the investment company adviser charges a performance 
fee.  Id. 
183Id. at 72,070. 
184Id. 
185Id. 
186Id. 
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and count each limited partner investor or shareholder as only one client.187  The 
result of this “look through” provision is that hedge fund advisers who manage 
“private funds” with more than $30,000,000 in assets and fifteen individual investors 
must register with the Commission.188  Before the Amended Act, most of these funds 
escaped regulation, but now all of them must register and are, thus, subject to certain 
compliance requirements.189 
B.  Requirements for Charging Profit Participation Fees 
For hedge funds to charge their customary profit participation fees, they must 
limit the availability of their funds to “qualified clients” or “qualified purchasers.”190  
A qualified purchaser is a natural person who owns at least $5,000,000 in 
investments.191  A “qualified client” is an investor having either a net worth of 
$1,500,000 or having $750,000 invested in the fund.192  Prior to amendment of the 
Act, some hedge funds only required individuals to be “accredited investors,” a 
standard which has less stringent financial requirements.193 An “accredited 
investor”194 is an investor having an individual income of $200,000 or joint income 
of $300,000, or having individual or joint net worth of $1,000,000.195  While some 
advisers required their clients to be “accredited investors,” others allowed individuals 
to invest in the fund by meeting lower investment requirements.196  The Amended 
Act grandfathers in those investors who are neither “qualified purchasers” nor 
“qualified investors” by allowing the fund to continue to charge them profit 
participation fees.197  However, all new participants must be “qualified purchasers” 
or “qualified clients.”198   
To continue to charge profit participation fees, funds relying on the 3(c)(1) 
exemption must limit their funds to “qualified clients,” while funds relying on the 
3(c)(7) exemption must limit their funds to “qualified purchasers.”199  Therefore, 
investors in 3(c)(1) funds will likely have either a net worth of $1,500,000 or have 
                                                                
187Id. at 72,071. 
188Id. 
189Id. 72,071. 
190Id. 
191See supra note 30. 
192See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). 
193Id.  
194See supra note 36.   
195Id. 
196Nancy R. Mandell, Hedge Funds Beware: Ready or Not, Here Comes Regulation, SEC. 
WK., Sept. 19, 2005, at 1.  
197See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054. 
198Id. at 72,073. 
199Id. at 72,076. 
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$750,000 invested in the fund.200  By contrast, investors in 3(c)(7) funds will have 
$5,000,000 of assets.201  Because hedge funds will continue to charge performance 
fees, they will only make their funds available to “qualified clients” and “qualified 
purchasers.”202 
C.  Funds of Funds Must Register with the Commission 
Just as an adviser to a hedge fund that is a “private fund” must register with the 
SEC, an adviser to a fund of fund (which falls under the definition of a “private 
fund”) must register with the Commission.203  Before the enactment of the Amended 
Advisers Act, most funds of funds escaped regulation by exempting themselves from 
the federal securities laws.204  Now, in addition to requiring funds of funds that meet 
the definition of a “private fund” to register with the Commission, the Act also 
includes a section that requires registration for funds of funds that do not meet the 
definition of a “private fund.”205  Section 203(b)(3)-2(b) prescribes a special rule for 
a fund of fund, which is a registered investment company under the Investment 
Company Act that does not qualify for the 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) exemption.206  This 
section requires an adviser of a fund of fund to “look through” the fund and count 
each investor as a client for purposes of the 203(b) “private adviser exemption.”207  
Therefore, even if a fund of fund does not fall under the definition of a “private 
fund,” an adviser of a fund of fund with more than $30,000,000 in assets and at least 
fifteen clients must register with the Commission.208 
While advisers to funds of funds must register with the Commission, because 
such funds do not charge profit participation fees, they may allow investors who are 
neither “qualified purchasers” nor “qualified clients” to invest in the fund.209  
Additionally, funds of funds typically only sell their funds to “accredited 
                                                                
200See STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 11. 
201See supra note 30. 
202Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
72,056.   
203Id. at 72,071. 
204Id. 
205Id. 
206Id. at 72,077.  Because this type of “fund of a hedge fund” is a registered investment 
company to which the 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exceptions do not apply, it is not a private fund and 
the adviser is not subject to regulation under the Amended Advisers Act absent another section 
requiring the adviser to register.  Id.  
207Id. at 72,071 (“Without the look-through requirement, an adviser could provide its 
services through fourteen or fewer top tier funds and continue to indirectly manage the assets 
of hundreds or, in the case of registered funds of hedge funds, thousands of investors, without 
registering or being subject to the Commission's oversight.”).   
208See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 326.   
209Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,071 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). 
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investors,”210 and the new rules mimic current practice by requiring that these funds 
only be sold to “accredited investors.”  One way someone qualifies as an “accredited 
investor” is to have an individual income of $200,000 or joint income of $300,000.211  
The other way is to have individual or joint net worth of $1,000,000.212  In addition 
to the requirement that individuals be “accredited investors,” the new rules also 
mimic current practice213 by requiring funds of funds to impose a minimum 
investment requirement of $25,000.  In addition to investment requirements, all 
funds of funds and hedge funds that do register with the Commission are subject to 
compliance requirements.             
D.  Compliance Requirements 
Registered advisers of hedge funds and funds of funds will have to comply with 
the rules of the Investment Advisers Act.214  Compliance with the Act mandates that 
hedge fund advisers meet five major requirements.215  These requirements are: (1) 
filing an adviser registration form, (2) keeping records, (3) providing a brochure, (4) 
developing compliance procedures, and (5) designating a chief compliance officer.216  
In addition, it subjects these advisers to random audits conducted by SEC 
examiners.217    
The first requirement is that hedge fund advisers file an investment adviser 
registration form (“Form ADV”) with the Commission and identify themselves as 
hedge fund advisers.218  Secondly, hedge fund advisers must keep books and records 
                                                                
210See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 5. 
211Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
72,071.    
212Id. 
213See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 5. 
214Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
72,071.   
215See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, app. B, at B-15-16.  Advisers are also 
subject to less costly requirements imposed by the Investment Advisers Act.  Id.  For example, 
registered advisers “cannot assign their advisory contracts without client consent, cannot 
engage in principal transactions with their clients without prior client consent, must take steps 
to protect client assets that are in their custody, and are limited in the types of performance 
fees they can charge.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
216See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 339. 
217Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
72,071.     
218Id. at 72,077.  “[A]dvisers’ responses to Form ADV are made available to the investing 
public on the Internet through the Investment Adviser Public Disclosure system.”  Id. at 
72,077 n.271.  Thus, investors will have access to information about their advisers.  Id.  
Furthermore, Form ADV will provide the Commission with information about the adviser 
because these forms are quite detailed.  Id. at 72,083.      
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in accordance with rule 204-2.219  The third requirement is that hedge fund advisers 
must provide a brochure to prospective and existing clients disclosing business 
practices and the background of the adviser.220  Fourth, hedge fund advisers must 
develop comprehensive compliance procedures.221  These procedures include ethics 
practices for advisory personnel,222 controls to protect clients’ assets,223 solicitations 
procedures for sales personnel,224 policies designed to insure advisers vote in the best 
interests of clients,225 and procedures designed to prevent violation of the Investment 
                                                                
219Id. at 72,085.  Two requirements are particularly important.  Id. at 72,076.  The first 
important requirement is that advisers advertising their past track record of performance must 
keep: 
 All accounts, books, internal working papers, and any other records or documents that 
are necessary to form the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance 
or rate of return of any or all managed accounts or securities recommendations in any 
notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment letter, bulletin or other 
communication that the investment adviser circulates or distributes, directly or 
indirectly, to 10 or more persons (other than persons connected with such investment 
adviser); provided, however, that, with respect to the performance of managed 
accounts, the retention of all account statements, if they reflect all debits, credits, and 
other transactions in a client's account for the period of the statement, and all 
worksheets necessary to demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of 
return of all managed accounts shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this 
paragraph. 
17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(16) (2003).  Such information is vital because many of the hedge 
funds charged with fraud have used false marketing materials to persuade new investors to put 
money into the fund and to keep current investor’s money in the fund.  See Registration Under 
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054.  The second 
important requirement is that the vast amount of records the adviser must keep under Section 
204-2 have to be maintained for five years.  17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(e)(3) (2003).     
220Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
72,085 (“Rule 206(4)-4 requires registered investment advisers to disclose to clients and 
prospective clients certain disciplinary history or a financial condition that is reasonably likely 
to affect contractual commitments.”).   
221See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 339. 
222Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
72,084 (“Rule 204A-1 requires SEC-registered investment advisers to adopt codes of ethics 
setting forth standards of conduct expected of their advisory personnel and addressing 
conflicts that arise from personal securities trading by their personnel, and requiring advisers’ 
‘access persons’ to report their personal securities transactions.”).   
223Id. (“Rule 206(4)-2 requires advisers with custody of their clients' funds and securities 
to maintain controls designed to protect those assets from being lost, misused, 
misappropriated, or subjected to financial reverses of the adviser.”).   
224Id. at 72,085 (“Rule 206(4)-3 requires advisers who pay cash fees to persons who solicit 
clients for the adviser to observe certain procedures in connection with solicitation activity.”). 
225Id. (“Rule 206(4)-6 requires an investment adviser that votes client securities to adopt 
written policies reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes in the best interests of 
clients, and requires the adviser to disclose to clients information about those policies and 
procedures.”).   
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Advisers Act.226  Lastly, advisers must designate a chief compliance officer.227  In 
addition, registration under the Act empowers the SEC to randomly audit hedge fund 
advisers at any time to assure that they are complying with these procedures.228 
VI.  PROBLEMS WITH THE AMENDED ADVISERS ACT 
While the Amended Advisers Act is a step in the right direction, it will not 
adequately regulate hedge funds.  There are five reasons why this Act is ineffective.  
These reasons are: (1) the various loopholes in the Act, (2) the SEC’s inability to 
conduct random audits, (3) the ineffectiveness of random audits in preventing fraud, 
(4) the failure of the rule to limit hedge funds’ use of leverage, and (5) the failure of 
the rule to limit retailization of funds of funds. 
A.  Various Loopholes in the Rule 
The first reason the rule is ineffective is because some funds will escape 
regulation due to three loopholes in the rule. 229  The first loophole is that a hedge 
fund can avoid registration by extending its lock-up period to two years.230  This 
means that funds can avoid regulation by disallowing investors from withdrawing 
money from the fund for twenty-four months.231  In doing so, it escapes the definition 
of a “private fund” and thus does not have to register with the Commission.232  
                                                                
226Id. (“Rule 206(4)-7 requires each registered investment adviser to adopt and implement 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers 
Act.”).   
227Id. at 72,085 (“Rule 206(4)-7 requires each registered investment adviser to . . . 
designate an individual to serve as chief compliance officer.”).  See also 17 C.F.R. § 
275.206(4)-7 (2003).  
22815 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2000) (“All records . . . of such investment advisers are subject at 
any time, or from time to time, to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by 
representatives of the Commission as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
229Chidem Kurdas, Use of Registration Loophole Seen as Risky, HEDGEWORLD DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 1; Jeff Benjamin, Hedge Funds Exploit a Loophole: Some Funds 
Extend Lockup to Avoid Regulatory Oversight, INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 26, 2005, (News), at 
1. Thomas Kostigen, New Rules Won’t Add Much Oversight on Hedge Funds, 
MARKETWATCH, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid= 
{C0E86627-7ABA-4657-A1AE-E956C17B6FDF}&siteid=tradehaven.   
230See Benjamin, supra note 229. 
231Id. 
232Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,096 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman, 
Comm’r,  & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).   
 [T]his criterion [the two year lock-up period for private funds] will encourage advisers 
to extend their redemption periods beyond two years in order to avoid registration.  
Therefore, it will be more difficult for investors, once they have made the decision to 
invest in a hedge fund, to “vote” on the quality and integrity of the hedge fund 
manager by leaving the fund. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Moreover, giving hedge funds an incentive to extend lock-ups may be 
counterproductive because hedge funds prefer longer access to capital and now have 
justification for requiring investors to leave their money in the fund for a greater 
duration.233  This lock-up period could also adversely affect investors because they 
cannot withdraw their money from the fund even if the fund is experiencing severe 
losses.234 
The second loophole is that some hedge funds have interpreted the Act to apply 
only to new investments.235  This interpretation is based on the requirement that a 
“private fund” must have a lock-up period of less than two years.236  Because only 
new investments are subject to this requirement, some hedge fund advisers believe 
that, for their fund to be defined as a “private fund,” it must accept new money.237  
Accordingly, some funds are choosing not to register with the Commission by either 
not accepting new money or by accepting new money subject to a two-year lock-up 
period.238  While there is not a specific grandfather provision,239 some hedge funds 
are capitalizing on this interpretation of the rule to avoid SEC registration.240    
The third loophole is that funds with less than $25,000,000 in assets do not have 
to register with the Commission.241 The SEC exempts these funds from registration242 
because of its lack of resources to conduct random audits.  However, according to 
the Commission, twenty of the forty-six cases brought at the time this amendment 
was proposed were committed by funds too small to register under the Amended 
Act.243  Therefore, exempting funds with $25,000,000 or less in assets ignores nearly 
                                                          
Furthermore, the Commissioners had parted ways just sixteen times during former 
Chairman William Donaldson’s tenure as director of the SEC.  Carrie Johnson, Independent 
Chairmen Required for Funds: SEC Aims to Eliminate Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST, June 
24, 2004, at E4.  Such disagreement only occurred in one percent of the 1,606 votes the 
agency conducted during this period.  Id.   
233See Kostigen, supra note 229, at 1. 
234Id. 
235
 See Kurdas, supra note 229. 
236Id. 
237Id. (“By the logic of the rule as written, there has been an inference that such managers 
[managers who do not take new money] would . . . be exempt.”). 
238Id. 
239Id. (“When the registration rule was being prepared, there was discussion as to whether 
to grandfather in managers that no longer take money . . . [b]ut in the end a grandfathering 
clause was not included in the rule.”).   
240Id. (“SEC Chairman Christopher Cox told a gathering in China that he was well aware 
some hedge funds were skirting the registration requirement by closing their funds to new 
investors.”).  
241Anuj Gangahar, SEC Rule Ignores Highest-risk Category of Fund Fraud, FIN. NEWS 
ONLINE US, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.financialnews-us.com/index.cfm?content id=537169. 
242Id. 
243Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
45,172, 45,198 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman, Comm’r,  
& Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).   
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half of the funds charged with committing fraud.244  In addition, the SEC is now 
considering exempting from registration hedge funds with less than $50,000,000 in 
assets245 due to their lack of resources. 
B.  SEC’s Inability to Conduct Random Audits 
The Commission does not have the resources to conduct random examinations of 
hedge funds.246  In fact, it barely has enough examiners to audit mutual funds.247  
Moreover, the SEC’s budget was cut in 2006, and it is thus unlikely that the 
Commission will be able to hire more inspectors.248  Even assuming that random 
audits are an effective method to regulate hedge funds, because the solution is too 
expensive, the SEC will not be able to successfully employ this practice.249 
C.  Ineffectiveness of Random Audits in Preventing Fraud 
Random audits, in addition to being too expensive, are unlikely to effectively 
detect fraud.250  This is primarily because such audits are done on a cyclical basis.251  
A conservative estimate of how often the SEC will conduct these examinations is 
once every five years, but the audits may be even more infrequent.252  While a 
perfectly timed examination may expose fraud, these examinations are so isolated 
that most fraudulent funds can successfully conceal their illegal activity.253  For 
example, a hedge fund may be able to register with the Commission, conduct 
business for up to five years, defraud investors, and close the fund before the SEC 
ever conducts an audit.254  While these audits could be performed retrospectively, it 
                                                                
244Id. 
245See Gangahar, supra note 241. 
246Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,093 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman, 
Comm’r,  & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).  (“The Commission lacks the resources necessary to 
conduct frequent, comprehensive hedge fund adviser examinations, and our lack of resources 
is a matter of public record.” (footnote omitted)). 
247See Swensen, supra note 44, at A21 (“The prospect of random audits likewise carries 
little potential benefit; the already overburdened Commission can barely deal with its mutual 
fund caseload.”). 
248Chidem Kurdas, Commissioner: Sound Industry Practices Offer Better Control than 
SEC Registration, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1. 
249See Swensen, supra note 44, at A21.  
250Letter from W. Hardy Callcott, Partner, Bingham McCutchen LLP, to Commissioners 
of the SEC, at 2 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/ 
whcallcott091504.pdf.  
251Id. at 1-2. 
252Id. (“I think most investors would be very surprised to learn that the Commission staff 
does not examine SEC-registered advisers even as often as twice a decade.”). 
253Id. at 2.  
254Id. 
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is unlikely that the fund will even exist, and if it does it will probably not be able to 
pay back investors.255  
In addition to the problems posed by cyclical examinations, regulation of the 
mutual fund industry shows that random audits alone do little to detect fraud.256  
Moreover, hedge funds are more complex than mutual funds and are therefore more 
difficult to audit.257  Because auditing hedge funds is complex and mutual fund audits 
show that this method alone does not prevent fraud, solely conducting random audits 
of hedge funds will not detect fraud.258   
With respect to deterrence, the threat of examination will not discourage 
individuals from committing fraud.259  Such a threat will not deter fraud because it is 
public knowledge that the SEC lacks the resources to frequently conduct audits.260  
Consequently, perpetrators will not be discouraged by only a slight increase in the 
risk of being apprehended for their actions. 
D.  Failure of the Rule to Limit Hedge Funds’ Use of Leverage 
The Amended Advisers Act does not address the problem that hedge funds’ use 
of leverage poses to financial markets.261  Concededly, the Advisers Act is not the 
appropriate regulation by which the SEC could limit hedge funds’ use of leverage.262  
However, leverage restrictions could be imposed by subjecting hedge funds to 
regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940.263  Failing to address the 
issue of leverage ignores the problem that started the government’s examination of 
                                                                
255Id. 
256See Kurdas, supra note 248, at 1.  Other measures taken in conjunction with random 
audits have been effective in detecting and deterring mutual fund fraud.  Id.  However, these 
measures are very expensive and even if they were employed, it is unlikely that they would 
help detect hedge fund fraud because of the complexity of these investments.  Id. 
257Id.   
258Id. 
259Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,093 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman, 
Comm’r,  & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).   
260Id. 
261Id. at 72,055-59 (majority) (explaining that the only reasons for amending the 
Investment Advisers Act are the growth of hedge funds, the growth of hedge fund fraud, and 
the retailization of hedge funds, and thus acknowledging by negative implication that the 
amendments do not address hedge funds’ use of leverage).   
262Id. at 72,058.  
 The principal concerns of the President's Working Group report were the stability of 
financial markets and the exposure of banks and other financial institutions to the 
counterparty risks of dealing with highly leveraged entities such as the LTCM hedge 
fund. The focus of the Advisers Act is different, and includes such concerns as the 
prevention of frauds on investors. 
Id. at 72,058 n.43. 
 
263Id. 
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this industry.264  Though the SEC chose not to address this problem at the time the 
Amended Act was proposed, it should have adopted a comprehensive legislative 
scheme regulating hedge funds.  Consequently, when the SEC decided to amend the 
Advisers Act to regulate hedge funds, it should have amended the Investment 
Company Act to restrict hedge funds’ use of leverage. 
E.  Failure of the Rule to Limit Retailization of Funds of Funds 
While the Amended Advisers Act increases the requirements for individuals to 
invest in hedge funds and requires funds of funds to register with the Commission, it 
does not restrict the sale of funds of funds to average investors.265  An individual who 
has income of $200,000 a year and $25,000 to invest in the market may invest in a 
fund of fund.266  Moreover, many individuals and married couples filing a joint return 
can meet the net worth requirement of $1,000,000, but some of these individuals are 
not experienced investors.267  Because average investors can invest in funds of funds 
and such funds are increasing their marketing to such investors, the Amended 
Advisers Act does not effectively limit the retailization of these funds.268 
VII.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
There are three cost effective and highly efficient solutions to remedy the 
problems created by hedge funds.  Each proposed solution is specifically designed to 
counteract the main problems269 caused by the hedge fund industry.  First, to prevent 
fraud, the SEC should require all hedge funds to register with the Commission, adopt 
a risk-based approach for conducting audits, and impose guidelines for determining 
which funds to audit.  Second, to restrict average investors’ access to funds of funds, 
the SEC should adopt the “qualified client” criteria for funds of funds and raise the 
minimum investment requirements for both funds of funds and traditional hedge 
funds.  Third, to prevent the risk of market collapse, the SEC should restrict hedge 
funds’ use of leverage by requiring that such use does not exceed a maximum 
leverage ratio. 
A.  Preventing Fraud 
To prevent fraud, the SEC should require all hedge fund advisers to register with 
the Commission.270  Such registration would allow the SEC to examine hedge funds 
with less than $30,000,000 worth of investments.271  Consequently, the Commission 
                                                                
264See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at 29 (“The LTCM episode well 
illustrates the need for . . . hedge funds, to face constraints in the amount of leverage they can 
assume.”). 
265See Zimmermann, supra note 40, at 1 (“[T]here are many unsophisticated investors who 
have the financial means to qualify.”). 
266Id. 
267Id. 
268Id.  
269See supra text accompanying notes 83-138.   
270See Gangahar, supra note 241.   
271Id. 
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would be empowered to monitor and audit hedge fund advisers who have been 
charged with nearly half of the counts of hedge fund fraud.272   
To prevent fraud, the SEC should also adopt a risk-based approach for 
conducting audits.  The reason the SEC must exempt from registration hedge fund 
advisers with fewer assets is because their system of random audits contains 
excessive administration costs.  Instead of using this cyclical approach, the SEC 
should adopt a risk-based system to determine which hedge funds pose the highest 
risk of fraud.273  In fact, the Commission is trying to develop such a system for all 
investment advisers, which will be specifically designed for the investment vehicle 
offered by each registrant.274 Under this system, risk factors for fraud would be 
developed for each investment vehicle.275  Then, when investment advisers exhibited 
one or more of the risk factors, the SEC would be prompted to audit the fund.276  
With respect to hedge funds, the SEC ought to conduct mini sweeps of hedge fund 
advisers to determine what criteria to use in this risk-assessment model.277  Such a 
system should be adopted because it allows the Commission to audit those funds that 
create the highest risk of fraud while conserving resources on funds that are 
complying with regulations. 
Finally, to prevent fraud, the SEC should impose guidelines for assessing which 
funds to audit.  A fundamental part of the risk-based approach should result in the 
Commission examining Form ADV to determine whether the hedge fund has listed a 
legitimate auditor and broker-dealer and to ascertain whether the fund has any 
affiliation with these firms.278  A legitimate auditor and broker-dealer would need to 
be an established business with a proven track record rather than a start-up company.  
                                                                
272Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 
72,054, 72,096 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman, 
Comm’r,  & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).   
273Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 13 (2004) (statement of William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, U.S. SEC), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname 
=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:29308.pdf.  Donaldson gave this testimony to support the 
release, issued thirteen days later, which proposed amendments to the Investment Advisers 
Act.   
274Id.   
 I have asked the staff to develop a phased approach to oversight and examination of 
our investment adviser registrants, including hedge fund advisers. Toward that end, we 
have formed a working group within the Commission which is comprised of senior 
staff from different offices and divisions within the Commission to explore how the 
Commission goes about overseeing investment adviser registrants in general and 
specifically including hedge fund advisers. 
Id. 
 
275Id. 
276Id. 
277Id. (“[O]ur examination staff could conduct mini-sweeps of hedge fund advisers to 
garner critical information about hedge fund services.”). 
278Jenny Anderson, A Modest Proposal to Prevent Hedge Fund Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2005, at C6. 
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The effectiveness of basing inspections on this information is best exemplified by re-
examining the fraud perpetrated by Bayou and Wood River.279   
Wood River listed a former American Express unit as their outside auditor, but 
that company did not audit the fund.280  Had the SEC used the legitimate auditor 
criteria to assess the risk of fraud created by Wood River, the Commission would 
have been prompted to audit the fund.   With respect to Bayou, its auditor was a 
fictitious accounting firm that was affiliated with the fund.281  If the SEC had used 
the affiliated auditor criteria to inspect the fund, the discovery of this auditor would 
have caused the Commission to examine Bayou.  The results of these methods are 
similar regarding the firms’ broker-dealers. Bayou’s broker-dealer, Bayou Securities, 
was a dealer affiliated with the fund.282  Had the SEC employed a risk-based system 
using the criteria of an affiliated broker, it would have been prompted to examine 
Bayou.  With respect to Wood River, the company claimed as a broker-dealer a firm 
that never executed any of its trades.283  If the SEC used the legitimate broker-dealer 
risk criteria, they would have conducted an examination of Wood River.   
Wood River and Bayou illustrate that it is difficult for a hedge fund adviser to 
commit fraud when it has legitimate and nonaffiliated auditors and broker-dealers.284  
By implementing a risk-based system, it is likely that audits of advisers can be 
conducted annually or bi-annually at the same cost as the current system of cyclical 
examinations. The result will be the auditing of the highest-risk advisers more 
frequently285 at the same cost. 
B. Restrict Average Investors Access to Funds of Funds 
To restrict average investors’ access to funds of funds, the SEC should adopt the 
“qualified client” criteria for funds of funds.  The SEC should require that investors 
in funds of funds be “qualified clients” rather than “accredited investors.”  The 
“accredited investor” standard286 allows average investors to invest in funds of funds.  
On the other hand, the “qualified investor” standard strikes the appropriate balance 
between preventing average investors from investing in hedge funds and allowing 
sophisticated individuals to make such investments.  Moreover, the SEC has already 
considered the “qualified investor” definition to be the correct standard for 
traditional hedge funds.287  Using the same standard will simplify the regulation of 
this industry.  Such uniformity will also reduce the confusing and conflicting nature 
of these requirements for investors because they do have quite different standards.  
Additionally, this standard is proper because funds of funds indirectly charge profit 
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participation fees and the “qualified investor” standard was specially designed for 
funds that charge such fees.288   
Other alternatives for increasing the requirements to invest in funds of funds are 
inappropriate because they interfere with the regulation of other investment vehicles.  
For example, changing the definition of an “accredited investor” to the definition of 
a “qualified investor” is not appropriate because it interferes with the use of this 
standard by private equity funds. Similarly, changing the definition of an “accredited 
investor” to that of a “qualified purchaser” would have similar adverse effects.  
Because mandating that an investor be a “qualified client” to invest in funds of funds 
increases the requirements to a sufficient amount but does not cause interference 
with other investments, it is the correct standard. 
To restrict average investors’ access to funds of funds, the SEC should also raise 
the minimum investment requirements for both funds of funds and traditional hedge 
funds.  In addition to requiring that individuals satisfy the definition of a “qualified 
client” to invest in funds of funds, the SEC should mandate that all hedge funds and 
funds of funds have a minimum investment requirement of $250,000.  While most 
hedge funds impose such a requirement, some hedge funds have decreased their 
requirements over time.289  Moreover, funds of funds already have investment 
minimums as low as $25,000.290  Requiring a $250,000 minimum accompanied by 
the “qualified client” definition creates uniformity for hedge funds and funds of 
funds.  This standard assures that average investors are restricted from investing in 
traditional hedge funds and funds of funds. 
C. Limiting the Risk of Market Collapse 
To prevent the risk of market collapse, the SEC should restrict hedge funds’ use 
of leverage.  While traditional hedge funds and funds of funds pose unique problems 
to average investors, the possibility of hedge funds causing a market crisis affects the 
entire financial system.  Because hedge funds are exempt from the Investment 
Company Act, they use large amounts of leverage to engage in risky investments.291  
A market shift against one large fund using leverage or against small funds that use 
leverage and have the same investment positions could cause these funds to default 
on their loans.292  When many debtors cannot pay creditors at the same time, it can 
cause the financial system to collapse.293   
To stop this excessive use of borrowed money, the SEC should restrict hedge 
funds’ use of leverage.294  The way to accomplish this goal is for the Commission to 
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employ the same method used for mutual funds, which is the requirement of a 
maximum leverage ratio.295  Like mutual funds, hedge funds have a large amount of 
assets invested in the markets.296  However, hedge fund investments cause a greater 
risk of market collapse than do mutual funds due to their use of leverage and lack of 
diversification.297  Because hedge funds are formidable in size and threaten the 
financial system, the SEC should limit hedge funds’ use of leverage by using a 
maximum leverage ratio. 298            
An effective rate for the maximum leverage ratio would be the rate used for 
mutual funds.  Under such regulation, hedge funds’ use of debt would be limited to 
one-third of its investments.299  For example, a hedge fund with $3,000,000 in assets 
could only borrow $1,000,000 to make investments.  To enact this requirement, the 
SEC should amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 to require that any fund 
exempted from registration as an “investment company” by either section 3(c)(1) or 
3(c)(7) of the Act, be subject to the leverage restrictions imposed by section 18 of the 
Act.300     
Employing a maximum leverage ratio would limit the amount of systemic risk 
created by hedge funds.  Systemic risk would be reduced because a hedge fund 
suffering large losses would have sufficient assets to pay off its debts.  Therefore, if 
the market caused one large hedge fund or several small funds with similar positions 
to lose large amounts of money, the fund or funds could still pay their creditors.  
Because funds would be able to pay their creditors, these funds would not default on 
their loans.  The problem of systemic risk would be eliminated and a situation 
analogous to the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management would be unlikely to 
occur. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Hedge funds are a viable investment alternative for financially sophisticated 
investors.  However, because traditional hedge funds and funds of funds are 
unsuitable for average investors, these investors should be restricted from making 
such investments.  Regardless of who invests in hedge funds, advisers of these 
entities must be regulated to assure that they do not commit fraud.  In addition to 
monitoring advisers, the SEC must limit hedge funds’ use of leverage to assure that 
market collapse does not occur.   
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While the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act addressed some of the 
problems created by hedge funds, it is insufficient to regulate these entities.  More 
SEC action is needed to adequately protect investors from the problems created by 
hedge funds.  While some of these actions were suggested in this Note, more 
measures are necessary to effectively regulate this growing industry. 
IX. ADDENDUM 
In Goldstein v. SEC,301 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated 
the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act holding that the rule was 
“arbitrary.”302  The hedge fund challenging the law successfully argued that the SEC 
misinterpreted section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act when it redefined the word 
“client” to include shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries of a 
“private fund.”303 The court reasoned that both Congress and the SEC had 
historically and recently concluded that individuals such as limited partners or 
shareholders are not “clients” for purposes of the Advisers Act.304  It further pointed 
out that it was “arbitrary” for funds with one hundred or fewer investors to be 
exempt from the more demanding Investment Company Act, while those with fifteen 
or more investors were subject to the Advisers Act.305 Consequently, the court 
vacated and remanded the Amended Investment Advisers Act.306    
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